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Trade Openness and Antitrust Law
Anu Bradford    Columbia University
Adam S. Chilton    University of Chicago
Abstract
Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb
anticompetitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship be
tween the two. Some argue that greater openness to trade makes antitrust laws
unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize
the benefits of trade liberalization. Limitations of data have made this debate
largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust
regimes empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities.
We find that openness to trade and stringency of antitrust laws are positively
correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears in
the early 1990s as a large number of countries adopt antitrust laws. However,
we find a positive correlation between openness to trade and resources and ac
tivities for antitrust enforcement for both early and late adopters of antitrust
regimes during this period.

1. Introduction
Increasing exposure to international trade and increasing the stringency of anti
trust laws are both ways that countries can curb anticompetitive behavior. For
instance, if a country wants to prevent a domestic manufacturer with monopoly
power from charging supracompetitive prices, one solution would be to reduce
barriers to foreign firms looking to import into the country. As long as the world
This research has benefited from helpful comments by many of our colleagues. We are particu
larly grateful to Rachel Brewster, Dhammika Dharmapala, Eric Helland, William Hubbard, Kater
ina Linos, Kyle Rozema, Alan Sykes, and Bartek Woda and participants of the 2017 Conference for
Empirical Legal Studies, the 2017 Conference of Empirical Legal Studies in Asia, the Law and Eco
nomics Workshop at King’s College in London, the Law and Economics Workshop at ETH Zurich,
the International Law Workshop at Berkeley Law School at the University of California, and fac
ulty workshops at Columbia Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. We owe special
thanks to the over 100 research assistants at Columbia Law School who helped us gather and code
the antitrust data. We are similarly indebted to the antitrust enforcers in the 103 agencies that gen
erously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National
Science Foundation that supported the early data-gathering effort (Law and Social Sciences Program
grants 1228453 and 1228483). The coding was expanded with the generous support of the Columbia
Public Policy Grant “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?”
and additional financial support from Columbia Law School.
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price for the goods is lower than the price the domestic manufacturer is charging,
import competition will make supracompetitive prices unsustainable. But an
other solution to the same problem is to adopt an antitrust law that prevents the
manufacturer from abusing its dominant position in the market.
Although trade and antitrust law can achieve many of the same ends, scholars
have long debated whether open economies will still benefit from enacting anti
trust regimes. Some scholars argue that antitrust laws are redundant in the pres
ence of open trade because foreign entrants are sufficient to destabilize cartels,
constrain dominant companies, and undermine other anticompetitive practices,
thereby keeping market competition in check (see, for example, Bhagwati 1968;
Helpman and Krugman 1989; Blackhurst 1991; Neven and Seabright 1997; Melitz
and Ottaviano 2008). In contrast, other scholars argue that, even with high levels
of trade, antitrust laws are needed to ensure that private anticompetitive prac
tices do not replace public barriers to trade and offset gains from trade liberaliza
tion (see, for example, Bond 2013; Motta and Onida 1997; Bartók and Miroudot
2008).1 However, this debate has been largely theoretical to date.
This is likely because studying this question empirically requires solving two
problems. First, it requires having a measure of the stringency of countries’ anti
trust regimes. Although a number of research projects have collected cross-
national data on antitrust policies, these efforts have limitations that make it dif
ficult to address this question. Second, estimating the effect of openness to trade
(hereafter, trade openness) on antitrust policy requires identifying a method that
can exogenously estimate countries’ exposure to trade. This is because measures
of trade openness typically express trade as a fraction of the total economy, but
antitrust policies can affect the size of the economy and in turn directly influence
the measure of trade openness. Given these obstacles, little is known about the
relationship between countries’ levels of trade openness and the antitrust laws
they adopt.
We test the relationship between trade openness and antitrust laws while ad
dressing both of these problems. To measure the stringency of antitrust laws, we
draw on what we believe to be the most comprehensive data set on antitrust laws
to date. To build the data set, we identified every country with an antitrust law
in place by 2010 and then set out to code every antitrust law that they passed
since their first antitrust law was adopted. We coded 700 antitrust laws for 126
countries. For each law, we coded 171 pieces of information, including detailed
information about the scope of the authority it bestows on the government and
the law’s substantive provisions. Using these data, we constructed a new measure
of the stringency of countries’ antitrust regimes: the competition law index (CLI).
In addition to coding antitrust laws, we also constructed several additional data
sets on antitrust regimes—including a data set of antitrust agencies’ resources
1
Others suggest that the relationship between trade and at least merger policy is entirely ambig
uous, with no reason to expect any particular correlation between the two (Horn and Levinsohn
2001).
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and enforcement activities between 1990 and 2010—that we use to further probe
this question.
To account for the endogenous relationship between antitrust laws and eco
nomic growth, we estimate a series of gravity equations to generate a measure
of trade openness that is exogenous to countries’ economic growth. We extend
a version of a gravity model developed by Ortega and Peri (2014) to predict the
value of trade between pairs of countries using information about the geographic
relationship between the countries and their relative sizes. We build on their
method by using more extensive trade data to generate predictions for the trade
between pairs of countries from 1950 to 2010. By aggregating the total predicted
trade for each country in each year, we generate estimates of countries’ total pre
dicted trade.
Our primary econometric specification uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) re
gressions to assess the relationship between trade openness and the stringency
of antitrust laws (hereafter, antitrust stringency) while instrumenting for trade
openness with our predicted trade measure. Using panel data from 1950 to 2010,
we find that trade openness and antitrust stringency are positively correlated.
This overall result holds when we use a variety of alternative methods to mea
sure them. We then extend our analysis by estimating cross-sectional regressions
for individual years. Doing so reveals that the positive correlation between trade
openness and antitrust stringency disappears in the early 1990s. We show that
this is not because the relationship changed for early adopters (countries that ad
opted antitrust regimes prior to 1990) but instead because there is no clear rela
tionship between trade openness and the antitrust policies for the late adopters
(countries that adopted antitrust regimes in the 1990s or thereafter). Finally, we
extend our analysis using data on antitrust enforcement resources and activities
from 1990 to 2010 that we collected by corresponding with 100 antitrust agencies
around the world. Using these data, we find that although there is not a clear cor
relation between trade openness and antitrust laws from 1990 to 2010, there is a
positive correlation between trade openness and greater antitrust enforcement
during that time. Moreover, this relationship exists for both early and late adopt
ers of antitrust regimes. One interpretation of this pattern is that countries with
low exposure to trade may have adopted stringent antitrust laws after 1990 but
have not necessarily enforced them.
Although we provide new evidence on the relationship between trade openness
and antitrust policies, this paper has several limitations. Notably, our empirical
strategy cannot show whether trade openness causes changes in antitrust law; in
stead, we can test only if there is likely a correlation. In addition, we do not ad
dress whether having both high levels of trade openness and stringent antitrust
regimes leads to better economic performance. Our results also do not explain
why countries with greater trade openness adopt stricter antitrust regimes. Coun
tries might do so because combining trade and antitrust is welfare enhancing, but
it is also plausible that countries adopt antitrust regimes to protect their markets
from foreign competition as traditional tools for protectionism wane with the lib
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eralization of trade (compare Cremieux and Snyder 2016). Our focus is on docu
menting the empirical relationship between these two tools of economic regula
tion, and we leave these important related questions to future research.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the prevalent theories of the
relationship between trade openness and antitrust regulation. Section 3 describes
the data we collected to measure antitrust stringency. Section 4 explains the ap
proach we use to estimate trade openness by predicting trade between countries
on the basis of their geography and size. Section 5 reports our primary results and
a range of robustness tests that examine the overall relationship between trade
openness and antitrust stringency. Section 6 conducts a series of cross-sectional
regressions that analyze the trends by year. Section 7 explores the relationship be
tween trade openness and antitrust enforcement resources and activities. Section
8 concludes.
2. The Relationship between Trade and Antitrust Law
We begin by outlining two common theoretical claims about the relationship
between trade openness and antitrust law. A brief discussion of the literature that
empirically tests the relationship between these two policies follows.
2.1. Trade and Antitrust Law as Substitutes
Many scholars suggest that trade liberalization may make adopting an antitrust
regime unnecessary (Bhagwati 1968; Helpman and Krugman 1989; Blackhurst
1991; Neven and Seabright 1997; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). According to this
view, free trade is an effective way to ensure that markets remain competitive be
cause facilitating entry checks market power (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982).
For example, when an economy is open to trade, monopolists refrain from abus
ing their market power because low external barriers ensure that competitors can
enter the market and contest any such abusive practices. In this way, trade lib
eralization renders an antitrust intervention into monopolistic practices super
fluous. Exports fueled by trade liberalization should also enhance market com
petition. New opportunities in export markets ensure that more firms can reach
an efficient scale of production, which further spurs competition and reduces the
need for an antitrust regime (Bartók and Miroudot 2008).
Relying on trade liberalization to safeguard market competition could have
several advantages. First, foreign producers must incur certain fixed costs and
variable trade costs to enter a new market that domestic producers do not in
cur. If foreign firms are able to enter and effectively compete even after incurring
those costs, they are presumably more efficient and hence may act as an even
more effective discipline on the market than domestic firms (Bartók and Mir
oudot 2008). Second, choosing free trade over antitrust regulation eliminates the
need to rely on government bureaucracies. Many who remain skeptical of gov
ernmental intervention favor free trade and thus prefer to have imports disci
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pline anticompetitive behavior. This argument may gain all the more force today
considering the complexities associated with antitrust regulators from over 130
countries all applying different rules in an effort to regulate the global market
place. Finally, although trade openness may “act as an effective antitrust policy”
(Pomfret 1992, p. 11), an effective antitrust policy does not act as an effective
trade policy. For example, if the United States were to impose a 30 percent tariff
on foreign producers today, foreign firms would likely not enter no matter how
competitive the markets are behind the border. Domestic antitrust laws thus may
do little to facilitate market entry in the presence of highly protectionist trade
policy.
2.2. Trade and Antitrust Law as Complements
Alternatively, since both free trade and vigorous antitrust enforcement disci
pline dominant firms, governments seeking to constrain dominant companies
may pursue both policies to the same end. Hence, there should be a positive re
lationship between free trade and the use of antitrust policies. Many scholars in
deed argue that trade and antitrust policy are likely to be positively correlated
(Bond 2013; Motta and Onida 1997; Bartók and Miroudot 2008; Bradford and
Büthe 2012). For instance, Bartók and Miroudot (2008) acknowledge that trade
policy and antitrust policy can act as substitutes because both destabilize cartels
and hence foster competition. However, the authors nevertheless describe trade
and competition policy as “mutually reinforcing.” This is in part because the ben
efits from collusion may be greater in the presence of open trade. For example,
open trade allows companies to operate across multiple markets and to extract
larger rents as a result (Bond 2013). Such cartels are also harder to detect and
prosecute because evidence may be scattered across multiple jurisdictions. This
may increase the net benefits from collusion, which makes anticompetitive be
havior more likely in the presence of open trade. This could explain why several
international cartels have successfully operated over multiple years and countries,
even in periods coinciding with substantial economic openness (Connor 2007).
Governments may thus deliberately strengthen antitrust regulations in the
presence of free trade to ensure that private anticompetitive conduct does not
undermine gains from trade liberalization. This logic motivated the adoption of
antitrust regulations by the European Union (EU), which initially adopted anti
trust rules to complement efforts to liberalize trade between EU member states.
The fear was that, without such laws, private companies could recreate barriers
between member states and undermine the functioning of the single market.
Antitrust laws were hence needed to ensure that the gains from free trade could
be fully realized and preserved. Antitrust laws and trade policies are also often
viewed as complementary because, while trade policy seeks to dismantle public
barriers to trade, antitrust law removes private barriers. Similarly, while trade lib
eralization seeks to maximize a country’s total surplus, antitrust law is more com
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monly aimed at the maximization of consumer surplus.2 These differences alone
may explain governments’ willingness to deploy both sets of policies as comple
mentary tools to preserve economic openness and market competition.
In addition, even if foreign firms are able to enter a market, they may not be
able to penetrate it and effectively compete if the market is tied by exclusive dis
tribution agreements. For example, in the 1980s, the US government complained
that, despite the liberalization of trade with Japan, US firms could not compete
on the Japanese market in industries such as automobiles and photographic film.
According to the critics, local antitrust laws failed to condemn exclusive distri
bution agreements that prevented US firms from having access to retailers and
hence to local consumers (Bond 2013; Scherer 1994). This illustrates how trade
policies may go only so far in rendering markets competitive, necessitating anti
trust to complement them.
2.3. Trade and Antitrust Law in Practice
Only a handful of studies have tested the relationship between trade open
ness and antitrust law empirically. Waked (2010) finds that trade openness and
antitrust enforcement resources are negatively correlated in a sample of devel
oping countries. A few other studies support the view that trade alone can ren
der markets competitive. Those studies generally examine the effects of import
penetration on some measure of competition—like market concentration ratios
or price-cost markup (Bartók and Miroudot 2008)—and find a negative correla
tion between trade openness and markups (Levinsohn 1993; Roberts and Tybout
1996; Tybout 2001). This implies that higher levels of imports lead to more com
petition and lower prices.
A few empirical studies instead suggest that trade openness and stringent anti
trust regimes may be positively correlated. Feinberg (1990) studies the correla
tion between the reduction in tariffs and antitrust enforcement budgets in the
United States, finding a positive association between trade liberalization and anti
trust enforcement. Feinberg also finds a comparable association between anti
trust fines and trade openness. Horn and Levinsohn (2001) reach a similar re
sult when examining merger policies and trade liberalization. While their results
are largely ambiguous, they conclude that trade liberalization may lead to stricter
antitrust standards. Cremieux and Snyder (2016) examine cartel enforcement by
the United States and the EU and find, among other things, that the United States
imposes higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms. If the nationality of
firms influences the enforcement of antitrust policy as they suggest, it may fol
low that antitrust laws are enforced more aggressively in the presence of foreign
competition.
2
However, our coding of the goals of antitrust laws suggests that some countries—including Can
ada and New Zealand—pursue total welfare as opposed to consumer welfare through antitrust laws.
This suggest that some jurisdictions see the goals of trade and antitrust policy as more overlapping
as opposed to distinct yet complementary.
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3. Measuring Antitrust Stringency
3.1. Prior Data Collection
The biggest hurdle to testing these theories on the relationship between trade
and antitrust is having the data to do so. Although there have been a number of
efforts to produce cross-national measures of antitrust policies (for example, Gut
mann and Voigt 2014; Petersen 2013; Ma 2011; Buccirossi et al. 2011; Clougherty
2010; Waked 2010; Voigt 2009; Nicholson 2008; Hylton and Deng 2007; Kee and
Hoekman 2007), all of the existing measures suffer from at least one major lim
itation.
First, several of the existing cross-national measures of antitrust law rely on a
binary coding of whether antitrust law exists in a given country-year (Gutmann
and Voigt 2014; Petersen 2013; Kee and Hoekman 2007). The problem with us
ing a binary coding for our research question is that it disregards the significant
variation among the laws. As a result, although it can be used to show whether
countries adopt antitrust laws in response to trade openness, it cannot distin
guish whether countries adopt more or less stringent regimes on the basis of their
exposure to trade.
Second, most data sets that go beyond a binary measure have coded informa
tion on only a small sample of countries. For instance, Buccirossi et al. (2011)
develop a comprehensive index of countries’ antitrust regimes but do so for just
13 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) mem
bers. Similarly, Clougherty (2010) collects data on the number of merger notifi
cations in 32 countries, Kee and Hoekman (2007) use a sample of 42 countries,
Nicholson (2008) uses a sample of 52 countries, and Voigt (2009) uses a sample
of 58 countries. Hylton and Deng (2007) is an exception. In what we believe is the
most ambitious previous effort to collect antitrust data, they code the statutes of
102 countries and produce an index of the overall stringency of national antitrust
laws.
Third, most existing data sets cover a limited number of years. For instance,
while Hylton and Deng (2007) develop a comprehensive measure of countries’
antitrust regimes, their data cover only 2001–4. Others collect data for similar
periods: Nicholson (2008) for 2003, Voigt (2009) for 1990–2000, Ma (2011) for
1990–2004, and Gutmann and Voigt (2014) for 2004–10.
3.2. Our Data Collection
Our goal was to comprehensively code every antitrust law every country had
ever adopted.3 To do so, we first identified the jurisdictions that adopted an anti
trust law by 2010.4 Our research identified 126 such countries. For each country,
we went back to the first law that it enacted and tried to identify every subsequent
We fully explain the data collection process in Bradford et al. (2019).
We elected to start our data set with 2010 data for practical considerations: we began collecting
data several years ago, and we selected a data point a few years prior so that we could reliably obtain
copies of laws that had been passed.
3
4
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law it passed until 2010. We included general antitrust laws, relevant sector-
specific regulations, and other laws (such as criminal laws or constitutions) that
contain provisions regulating market competition. Using this approach, we
coded 700 antitrust laws in place by the end of 2010.5
Figure 1 indicates the countries that had an antitrust law in place every 10 years
from 1960 to 2010. Figure 1 shows that, over the years, antitrust regimes have
been adopted in countries around the world, including by democracies and non
democracies and by developed and developing countries alike. In fact, antitrust
regimes have become so common that, by 2010, the 126 countries with antitrust
laws contributed 95.4 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). Fig
ure 1 also shows that most countries adopted antitrust laws in the last 30 years,
with the greatest expansion taking place in the 1990s.
In addition to identifying these laws, we developed a survey instrument to code
their content. We built on the coding schemes used by Hylton and Deng (2007)
and Nicholson (2008) as a starting point for our coding instrument. With the ad
vantage of hindsight, we added variables to more thoroughly measure each coun
try’s antitrust laws. Our survey instrument thus includes 171 entry fields, with
questions covering the scope of the antitrust authority, merger control, the abuse
of a dominant position, and anticompetitive agreements.
To complete the coding, we recruited and trained a team of law students. We
engaged students who were trained in different jurisdictions and possessed rele
vant language skills. Each law was assigned to two coders for independent review.
Both coders followed identical procedures, reaching out for guidance as needed
from us and senior coders who had extensive experience in the project. For coun
tries that had passed multiple laws over time or in the same year, the coders re
searched the relationship between each law so that we could annualize the data
and have an accurate picture of a country’s antitrust regime in any given year.6
Once two coders completed coding laws for a country, a third coder completed
a discrepancy analysis by reviewing all fields in which the original coders pro
vided differing responses, consulting the text of the underlying law. The output
of the discrepancy analysis produced a final consensus response to every field for
every law. Countries that did not have a law in a given year were coded 0 for all
variables. We thus created a country-year data set for all countries in the interna
tional state system.

5
We have not completed the coding of laws in three jurisdictions. We were unable to obtain a
copy of laws we believe to exist for two countries—Djibouti and Iran—and we have been unable to
complete coding of the Faroe Islands because we have not yet identified coders with appropriate lan
guage skills. To account for this, all of our regressions include an unreported indicator variable for
the country-years for which we have identified a law that we have not yet been able to code.
6
We researched the relationship between laws to understand whether subsequent laws supple
mented or replaced prior provisions. For instance, if a country passed a law in 1980 that required
merger notification and then passed a new law in 1990 that did not mention merger notification, we
tried to determine whether that was because the new law removed the merger notification require
ment or did not mention it because merger notification was already required.

Figure 1. Countries with antitrust laws over time
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3.3. Creating the Competition Law Index
Once we had coded the contents of the world’s antitrust laws, we developed
a measure of their stringency. Following prior research (for example, Hylton
and Deng 2007; Nicholson 2008; Buccirossi et al. 2011), we elected to develop
an index that measures the stringency of each country’s antitrust law in a given
year. Because we fully introduce the CLI in Bradford and Chilton (2018), we only
briefly describe it here. The goal of the CLI is to measure the intensity of compe
tition regulation in any given country in any given year. It does so by aggregating
the prohibitive elements of the various components of countries’ antitrust laws.
The more types of behaviors the law prohibits or the more extensive remedies
the law entails, the higher the CLI score. At the same time, the more the law rec
ognizes defenses and exemptions from the law, the lower the CLI score. At this
point, it is important to stress that the CLI is not a measure of the quality of an
antitrust regime. Instead of creating a coding of whether regimes have optimal
antitrust regimes, the CLI simply codes whether countries have provisions that
extend or limit the possible scope of antitrust regulation. For instance, some es
tablished antitrust jurisdictions have lower CLI scores because of their common
tendency to include defenses that call agencies to consider procompetitive effects
of the conduct or transaction in question.7
The CLI consists of two equally weighted parts: the first captures the authority
that a country’s antitrust law conveys, and the second captures the substance of
the law. By “antitrust authority,” we refer to the broader structure of the antitrust
regime, including the powers that the law gives to enforce antitrust laws. These
provisions determine who can bring antitrust suits and what remedies can be im
posed if a violation is found. These provisions also define whether all industries
and enterprise types fall within the scope of the law and whether the law can be
applied extraterritorially.
By “substance of the law,” we refer to rules in three substantive areas: merger
control, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive agreements. “Merger control”
refers to provisions regulating the notification of proposed mergers, the stan
dards by which mergers are reviewed, and the defenses that firms can advance
to argue that the anticompetitive effects of a merger may be offset by benefits the
transaction generates. “Abuse of dominance” refers to provisions that determine
the various types of a company’s conduct that constitute anticompetitive abuses
of dominant position. Finally, “anticompetitive agreements” refer to prohibitions
on both horizontal and vertical agreements between companies. This includes
regulating common practices of cartels such as price fixing and market sharing
but also vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance. These three areas are
weighted equally.
To construct the CLI, for each country-year, countries are assigned points ac
cording to the presence of the variables listed in Table 1. We then equally weight
7
See Bradford and Chilton (2018) for a longer justification of the way the competition law index
(CLI) is constructed. Section OA1 of the Online Appendix provides additional information about
the CLI.
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Table 1
Components of the Competition Law Index
Score
Authority:
Private right of action
Fines
Imprisonment
Divestitures
Damages
Extraterritoriality
Industry exemptions
Enterprise exemptions—categorical
Abuse of dominance:
General prohibition
Market access
Tying
Discounts
Unfair pricing
Discriminatory pricing
Predatory pricing
Retail price maintenance
Other abusive acts
Efficiency defense
Public interest defense

1
1
1
1
1
1
−.5
−.5
2

.25
.25
.25
.25
.25
.25
.25
.25
−.5
−.5

Score
Merger control:
Pre-merger notification
Mandatory notification
Substantive assessment: economic
Substantive assessment: public interest
Efficiency defense
Failing firm defense
Public interest defense
Anticompetitive agreements:
Price fixing
Market sharing
Output limitations
Bid rigging
Tying
Exclusive dealing
Resale price maintenance
Elimination of competitors
Efficiency defense
Public interest defense

1
1
1
1
−.5
−.5
−.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
.5
−.5
−.5

the authority and substance components of the index. We then normalize all
scores to be between 0 and 1. Country-years without an antitrust law in place
are scored 0, and a country receives the same score for all years that it has the
same regime in place. Figure 2 shows the score for each country in 2010 and the
substantial variation in countries’ antitrust regimes as measured by the CLI. For
example, Canada and Australia notably have more stringent regimes than the
United States. (Although, as we discuss in Section 5.3, this may be due to the
oversized role that the common law plays in antitrust regulation in the United
States.)
Of course, one drawback of an index such as the CLI is that it relies on sub
jective decisions about what variables to include and how to weight them. The
decisions we made are based on discussions with leading academic experts and
representatives of antitrust authorities and our own judgments. In Section 5.3,
however, we test the robustness of our findings using several alternative ap
proaches to measuring the stringency of antitrust regimes.
4. Measuring Trade Openness
4.1. Empirical Approach
The next hurdle when testing whether trade openness is associated with greater
antitrust stringency is measuring trade openness. The fundamental difficulty
with doing so is that trade openness both causes economic growth and is a con
sequence of economic growth. Thus, trade may produce economic changes that

Figure 2. Competition law index score by country, 2010
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lead a country to adopt a stringent antitrust regime, but the adoption of an anti
trust regime may produce economic changes that result in more trade. In other
words, the relationship between trade and antitrust policy is endogenous.
Fortunately, scholars have developed methods to produce exogenous estimates
of countries’ openness to trade. The first breakthrough that made this possible is
the gravity equation, which was introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and has been
part of mainstream macroeconomics since the mid-1990s (see generally Head
and Mayer 2014). This equation has proven surprisingly stable across time be
tween pairs of countries and using different methodologies (Chaney 2017). The
basic insight of gravity models is that the trade between two countries can be
predicted by the size of their economies and the distance between them. That is,
bilateral trade is proportional to any two countries’ GDP and inversely propor
tional to their distance, or more formally,
(1) Trade A,B µ

(GDPA )a (GDPB )b
.
(Distance AB )V

(1)

Although gravity equations make it possible to predict trade, the standard ver
sion of the equation relies on using GDP as an input. Producing an exogenous
estimate of trade while using the gravity equation thus required a second break
through. This came from Frankel and Romer (1999), who argue that the gravity
equation demonstrates that geography is a powerful predictor of trade and of a
country’s income. But although geography can influence a country’s wealth, the
country’s wealth cannot influence its geography. The result is that geographic de
terminants of wealth can be introduced into the framework of a gravity equation
to produce an estimate of expected trade into a country in a given year. Using
this insight, Frankel and Romer estimate countries’ predicted trade on the basis
of their geography and then use predicted trade as an instrument for trade open
ness. Frankel and Romer’s original implementation has since been criticized for
not accounting for all the ways in which geography can influence growth (Ro
dríguez and Rodrik 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004), but the basic
insight underlying their model remains valid, and the approach for predicting
trade is still used.
4.2. Implementation
To implement this method, we follow the approach developed by Ortega and
Peri (2014). Ortega and Peri develop an exogenous instrument for trade to esti
mate the relationship between countries’ openness to trade and migration and
those countries’ incomes.8 They build on Frankel and Romer (1999) and subse
quent developments to produce estimates of the bilateral trade between countries
in 2000, using information about the countries’ relevant geography and size. The
advantage of these equations is that, after controlling for a country’s size, vari
8
We set aside the part of Ortega and Peri (2014) that incorporates migration and focus solely on
trade.
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ations in the values of predicted trade shares (PTSH) are driven solely by “the
relative position of a country in terms of its geography and cultural coordinates”
(Ortega and Peri 2014, p. 234).
Ortega and Peri (2014) use a data set with observations for pairs of countries
and data on the trade and relevant geographic variables for each pair. Using these
data, they estimate the following equation to estimate the trade shares (TSH) that
each country receives from every other country:
lnTSHcj = g1 ln(Dist)cj + g2 ln(Population)c + g3 ln(Population) j
+ g 4 ln(Area)c + g5 ln(Area) j + g6 (Landlocked)cj
+ g7 (Border)cj + g8 ln(ComLang)cj + g9 ln(ComOffLang)cj
(2)

+ g10 ln(Shared Time Zone)cj + g11 ln(Colony)cj
+ g12 ln(Orgin Country Hegemony)cj + g13 ln(Dist)cj (Border)cj

(2)

+ g14 ln(Population)c (Border)cj + g15 ln(Population) j (Border)cj
+ g16 ln(Area)c (Border)cj + g17 ln(Area) j (Border)cj
+ g18 ln(Landlocked)c (Border)cj .
The dependent variable TSH is the value of the trade (exports plus imports) be
tween country c and country j divided by the GDP of country c. The equation in
cludes 12 explanatory variables: distance between the countries, population and
area of both countries, the number of countries that are landlocked, and dummy
variables for a shared border, common language, common official language,
shared time zone, colonial history, and prior hegemonic relationship. The equa
tion includes interactions for the geography variables and shared borders.
After estimating the gravity equation, Ortega and Peri (2014) calculate the pre
dicted values for each country pair and aggregate them for each country c. We
replicate the specifications used by Ortega and Peri in equation (2). Also follow
ing Ortega and Peri, to aggregate the predicted trade shares for each country c, we
define Zcj as the vector of explanatory variables and γ as the vector of coefficients
in equation (2). We then aggregate the predicted trade share for country c by us
ing the following formula:
=
(3) TSH
c
å exp(gˆ Zcj ).
j ¹c

(3)

Ortega and Peri (2014) generate PTSH only for 2000, but because we have exten
sive time-series data on antitrust laws, we set out to develop a prediction of trade
between countries for as long a period as possible. This requires two key changes
to Ortega and Peri’s approach. First, we use a different source of trade data to
cover more years. To obtain data on bilateral trade from 1950 to 2010, we use the
Correlates of War bilateral trade data set and the International Monetary Fund’s
Direction of Trade Statistics data set.9
9
Despite using these two data sets, there are dyad-year observations for which the data are miss
ing for various reasons. We also exclude data from Liberia and Tuvalu from our analysis because of
extreme fluctuations in their trade data.

Trade Openness and Antitrust Law

43

Second, we estimate our gravity equation separately for each year from 1950
to 2010. The reason for doing so is that, although the variables used to instru
ment for trade are primarily time invariant, the geographic costs of trade change
over time (Feyrer 2009a, 2009b). Estimating the equation separately for each year
allows the coefficients for the instrumental variables to take different values for
each year (see Badinger and Nindl 2014). It is important to note that, although
many papers that use this strategy to estimate trade openness rely exclusively
on a single year of cross-sectional data (for example, Frankel and Romer 1999),
others either pool observations across years to test the overall relationships (for
example, Cavallo and Frankel 2008; Calderón, Chong, and Stein 2007; Badinger
and Nindl 2014; Calderón and Kubota 2018) or estimate regressions separately
for multiple years (for example, Irwin and Terviö 2002). Because the relationship
between trade and antitrust law appears to have changed over time, we adopt the
latter two strategies (reported in Sections 5 and 6).
Despite these two differences, the correlation between our estimates and the
estimates in Ortega and Peri (2014) for 2000 is .79; when we exclude observations
for countries for which missing data led Ortega and Peri to estimate no trade
shares for a country, the correlation between our estimates is .89.10 To provide
a sense of the data on trade openness, Figure 3 plots PTSH for 2010 by quintile.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the data we use in the gravity equations
and the analysis in Sections 5–7.
5. Primary Analysis
5.1. Estimation Strategy
To estimate whether greater trade openness is associated with increased anti
trust stringency, we use a 2SLS regression. In the first stage, we instrument for
TSH for country c in year i with the PTSH for country c in year i. To ensure that
our instrumental variable isolates the amount of predicted trade attributable to
geography, following Ortega and Peri (2014) our first-stage regression also con
trols for each country’s population and area. We lag all time-variant variables
1 year. Our first-stage regression takes the following form:
(4) TSHc ,i-1 = b0 + bT PTSHc ,i-1 + bP lnPopulationc ,i-1 + bA lnArea c + e.

(4)

In the second stage, we estimate the impact of TSH on CLI score while con
trolling for the country’s size. The second-stage equation is thus
(5) CLIc ,i = b0 + bT TSHc ,i-1 + bP lnPopulationc ,i-1 + bA lnArea c + e.

(5)

10
Section OA2 of the Online Appendix compares our estimates of predicted trade shares (PTSH)
with those in Ortega and Peri (2014).
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Figure 3. Predicted trade share by country, 2010
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Gravity equation data:
Country-level characteristics:
   Population of origin country (millions)
   Population of destination country (millions)
   Area of origin country (thousands of km2)
   Area of destination country (thousands of km2)
Dyad-level characteristics:
   Population-weighted distance (km)
   Landlocked origin + landlocked destination
   Time zone difference
   Origin and destination are contiguous
   Formerly in a colonial relationship
   Origin is or was hegemon of destination
   Common language spoken by >9% of population
   Common official language
Primary regression data:
CLI
PTSH
Trade Openness
Population (ln)
Area (ln)
Antitrust enforcement data:
Budgets
Staff Size (ln)
Investigations (ln)
Remedies (ln)
29.10
27.92
744.81
776.34
8,009.86
.34
4.67
.02
.01
.01
.15
.17
.19
.54
.51
2.16
11.83
.09
.35
.17
.10

855,954
855,954
855,954
855,954
855,954
855,954
855,954
855,954
9,070
7,973
8,162
8,823
9,020
9,005
9,070
9,070
9,070

Mean

10,063
10,750
10,063
10,750

N

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics

.32
1.20
.72
.49

.29
.29
.40
1.40
2.34

4,470.91
.53
3.40

109.91
106.66
1,874.62
2,137.85

SD

0
0
0
0

0
.04
.00
.01
3.09

60.77
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

.01
.00
.02
.02

Min

1.61
7.81
8.11
7.41

1
2.19
6.33
7.20
16.92

19,781.39
2
12
1
1
1
1
1

1,371.22
1,371.22
22,275.98
22,275.98

Max
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Table 3
Trade Openness and Antitrust Stringency:
Reduced-Form Baseline Results
PTSH
Population (ln)
Area (ln)
Region dummies
Time trend
R2

(1)

(2)

(3)

.313**
(.055)
.098**
(.019)
.006
(.010)
No
No
.212

.334**
(.050)
.095**
(.017)
.015+
(.009)
Yes
No
.335

.136*
(.060)
.071**
(.018)
.018*
(.009)
Yes
Yes
.390

Note. The dependent variable is the competition law in
dex. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. N = 7,973.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

5.2. Primary Results
Tables 3 and 4 report our baseline results. We begin in Table 3 by simply pre
senting a reduced-form pooled OLS regression that estimates the impact of PTSH
on CLI. Column 1 controls for the size of the country, column 2 accounts for re
gional differences in trade and antitrust policies, and column 3 accounts for the
possibility that there is a secular trend in antitrust stringency.11 In Table 4, we use
the 2SLS regression strategy discussed in Section 5.1. In these regressions, in the
first stage, PTSH is an instrument for TSH.12
There are several things worth noting about the regression specifications in
Tables 3 and 4. First, the reason we do not include a wider range of control vari
ables is that trade has previously been shown to impact everything from income
(Frankel and Romer 1999) to levels of democracy (López-Córdova and Meissner
2008), and thus many standard control variables would be inappropriate since
they are also outcomes of exposure to trade. Second, we use region fixed effects
instead of country fixed effects in part because there is little variance in most
countries’ CLI scores from year to year, and thus we believe that country fixed ef
fects are inappropriate. That said, the results that include a time trend are robust
to the addition of year and country fixed effects.
Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, for countries of the same size, countries in which
trade makes up a larger share of the economy are also likely to have more strin
gent antitrust laws. The results attenuate with the addition of the time trend and
11
The time trend we include is not country specific. In addition, the results using a time trend are
robust to using year fixed effects instead of a linear time trend.
12
We report Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics for weak identification, which all lie above the most de
manding critical values reported by Stock and Yogo (2005). We can thus reject the null hypothesis
that PTSH is a weak instrument for trade openness.
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Table 4
Trade Openness and Antitrust Stringency:
Two-Stage Least Squares Baseline Results
(1)
Second stage:
Trade Openness
Population (ln)
Area (ln)
First stage:
PTSH
Population (ln)
Area (ln)
Region dummies
Time trend
R2
F-statistics

(2)

(3)

.624**
(.126)
.107**
(.023)
.027
(.017)

.672**
(.130)
.115**
(.021)
.032*
(.016)

.378+
(.193)
.088**
(.021)
.027*
(.013)

.501**
(.063)
−.014
(.021)
−.034+
(.018)
No
No
−.197
63.803

.496**
(.065)
−.030
(.019)
−.025
(.018)
Yes
No
−.166
58.906

.358**
(.078)
−.046*
(.020)
−.023
(.018)
Yes
Yes
.222
21.280

Note. The dependent variable is the competition law in
dex. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in
parentheses. N = 7,970. Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics are
for weak identification.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

region fixed effects but remain positive and statistically significant. To illustrate
these results, Figure 4 presents a binned scatterplot that shows the relationship of
trade openness to countries’ CLI scores using the regression specification from
column 3 of Table 4.13 Figure 4 reveals a positive relationship between predicted
trade shares and CLI scores.
The size of the effect is also economically significant. To measure this, we cal
culate the marginal effects associated with a change in a country’s level of trade
shares. While holding the other variables at their means, for column 3 in Table
4, moving from the 10th percentile value of TSH (.16) to the 90th percentile (.95)
is associated with a .29 change in the CLI score. As a reminder, the CLI score is
normalized to range from 0 to 1. To put this in perspective, the country with the
median CLI score in 2010 is .56 (approximately the value for the Ivory Coast). An
increase of .29 would result in a score of roughly .85, which is roughly 80 coun
tries higher on the CLI scale (approximately the value for Estonia).
13
Figure 4 first regresses trade shares (TSH) on PTSH (while controlling for population, area, re
gion fixed effects, and a time trend) and then plots the predicted values from that regression against
the CLI while controlling for the same variables.
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Figure 4. Relationship between trade and the competition law index

5.3. Robustness Checks
These results are robust to using alternative measures of antitrust policy and
trade openness. Section OA3 of the Online Appendix reports our results using
alternative measures.
Measuring Antitrust Regulation. We conduct four tests to ensure that our re
sults are not driven by the way we construct the CLI. First, we create a subindex
for each of the four categories of variables reported in Table 1 and then reesti
mate our primary specifications using each of them as the dependent variable.
Second, instead of weighting the variables in Table 1, we simply count the num
ber of provisions each country has in its law in a given year (for example, if a
country scores a 1 for each of the 36 variables, its score would be 36). Third, we
use factor analysis of the variables in Table 1 to produce a new weighting scheme
driven entirely by the characteristics of the data. Fourth, we create a binary vari
able for the presence of an antitrust regime by coding all countries with a CLI
score greater than 0 as 1. Across these additional specifications, the results are
consistently positive and statistically significant. As we explain in Section 7, our
results are also robust to using measures of antitrust enforcement resources and
activities instead of the CLI.
Accounting for the Role of the Judiciary. In some countries, judge-made law is
a major source of antitrust regulation. In the United States, for example, courts
have added numerous rules to the relatively spare regulation of anticompetitive
behavior found in statutes. If there are many countries like the United States,
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our coding of laws on the books may systematically bias our measure of antitrust
stringency. To investigate this, we surveyed antitrust experts from around the
world about the role that courts play in the development of antitrust law in their
countries. In the survey, we asked, “In practice, do the courts generate new law
by changing the scope of the antitrust statutes in [country]? Please answer on a
scale from 1 (no role) to 5 (extensive role).” We recruited experts to take the sur
vey by circulating it to contacts we made while collecting antitrust data, attend
ees at international antitrust conferences, and members of the Academic Society
of Competition Law. We received 166 responses from 86 countries with antitrust
regimes.14 The results of the survey suggest that courts play a large or extensive
role in the development of antitrust law in just 12 countries (most of which are
known for their common-law legal traditions).15 We then reestimated our base
line specifications while controlling for countries where courts play a large role
in the development of antitrust law.16 The coefficients of interest remain substan
tively similar to our primary results.
Accounting for Exemptions and Narrow Applications. Countries often ex
plicitly stipulate that antitrust laws do not apply uniformly. Instead, the law or
a given provision may not apply to a particular industry or enterprise. To ac
count for this, we created a separate data set of the exemptions in countries’ anti
trust laws by recoding the laws in our data set to record whether each provision
contained any of the following exemptions: general industry exemptions (for
example, exempting the telecommunications industry from tying prohibition),
complete enterprise-type exemptions (for example, exempting all state-owned
enterprises from tying prohibition), partial enterprise-type exemptions (for
example, exempting state-owned enterprises from tying prohibition to the ex
tent that they engage in provision of public services), or narrow applications (for
example, specifying that the telecommunications industry is the only industry
covered by the tying provision). Using these additional, more nuanced data, we
recoded the 36 variables composing the CLI on the basis of the presence of these
exemptions. We recoded countries coded as 1 for a given provision in a given
year to .8 if there was a general industry exemption, to .8 if there was a complete
enterprise-type exemption, to .9 if there was a partial enterprise-type exemption,
and to .1 if there was narrow industry coverage.17 The results remain positive and
statistically significant when using the adjusted CLI as the dependent variable.
Accounting for European Union Law. Our research suggests that there are
seven regional organizations that in some way regulate their members’ antitrust
regimes (see Section 6). For five of them, the regional law and members’ national
laws operate in different spheres. For instance, Common Market for Eastern and
For countries with multiple respondents, we averaged the responses.
The 12 countries that received an average score of 4 or higher are Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.
16
We control for countries with antitrust regimes if we did not receive a response to our survey.
17
Provisions with narrow industry coverage are recoded from 1 to 0 in our primary specifications
to reflect the fact that these laws are not of general applicability.
14
15
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Southern Africa (COMESA) rules address only cross-border anticompetitive
conduct and leave individual member states to regulate their domestic markets.
But this is not true of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA), which
have antitrust rules that split authority between the member states and the re
gional organization (for example, some issues are regulated by national law, some
by EU/EEA law, and some by both). To account for this, we coded the EU/EEA
competition laws and then recoded the CLI scores of EU/EEA members to ac
count for the regional laws. For instance, when constructing the CLI for Ger
many, we apply the German national coding for variables if the EU treaty stipu
lates that member states’ laws take precedence. But for variables for which the EU
law takes precedence, the recoding uses EU law instead of German coding for the
variable. And if EU law allows for enforcement under either German law or EU
law, we count any given provision as existing if it can be derived from either Ger
man law or EU law. When accounting for antitrust rules in this way, the results
remain positive and statistically significant.
Measuring Trade Openness. We also test the robustness of our primary re
sults using two alternative measures of trade openness that rely on countries’ pol
icies instead of trade flows. First, we use the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of
trade openness. This is a binary indicator variable that treats economies as closed
if any of the designated conditions hold (including average tariff rates exceeding
40 percent, nontariff barriers covering over 40 percent of imports, and so on).18
Second, we use data from the KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006) for eco
nomic globalization, which captures policies on trade and investment flows and
on trade and capital account restrictions from 1970 to 2013.19 We find positive
and statistically significant relationships with both measures and CLI scores.
6. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Our analysis so far has used panel data with country-year observations. There
are, however, several limitations to this approach. One concern is that there is
relatively little year-to-year variance in countries’ antitrust laws. While some
countries passed antitrust laws every few years, other countries passed one law
and never amended it, and others have never passed an antitrust law. Another
concern is that although we estimate the gravity model in equation (2) separately
for each year (which allows the predicted trade to change in response to shifts
in trade flows and the coefficients to take on different values as the geographic
costs of trade evolve), the values for the variables included in the regression do
not change from year to year. Finally, the relationship between trade openness
18
A downside of this measure is that it is available only until 1992, which is particularly problem
atic for our application because antitrust laws became much more common in the 1990s.
19
We elected to use the KOF globalization index as a measure of trade openness because it incor
porates coding on policy for an extended period. But since the measure incorporates data on trade
and investment flows as well as policies, this measure may suffer from the same endogeneity prob
lems as using a standard measure based on ratios of trade to gross domestic product.
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Figure 5. Cross-sectional regressions, 1960–2010

and antitrust laws may have evolved, and pooling all observations may thus mask
considerable variation over time.
We thus explore the relationship between trade openness and antitrust law us
ing cross-sectional regressions. Figure 5 reports results while subsetting the data
for each year from 1961 to 2010.20 Figure 5 plots the point estimate and 90 per
cent confidence interval for the variable TSH using the 2SLS regression speci
fication from column 2 of Table 4. Figure 5 reveals that the point estimates are
positive for all years from 1960 until 1991 and that the estimates are statistically
significant at the .1 level or higher in 23 of those years. But the pattern changes af
ter 1991, after which the point estimates are either approximately 0 or, in a hand
ful of years, slightly negative. In other words, the positive relationship between
trade openness and antitrust stringency appears to disappear in the 1990s.
There are several possible explanations for this pattern. Countries’ exposure
to trade may have changed as a result of shocks to the global economy during
the 1990s, including the creation of the World Trade Organization, the fall of
the Soviet Union and the opening of the eastern bloc, the rise of China’s export
ing power, and changes to transportation costs and communications technology.
This could have changed the relationship between trade openness and antitrust
law even for countries with established antitrust agencies. In addition, the num
ber of countries with antitrust regimes exploded in the 1990s, and it is possible
that the countries that adopted regimes during this period may have done so for
different reasons than countries that regulated antitrust policies earlier.
To investigate these explanations, Figure 6 reports the results of regressions es
20
The coefficients are also positive in each year from 1950 to 1960. We do not report these data,
however, because there are extremely large confidence intervals because of the limited number of
countries with antitrust laws during this period.
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Figure 6. Trade openness and the competition law index, 1990–2010

timated on two subsamples of our data: early adopters (excluding countries that
adopted antitrust laws after 1990) and late adopters (excluding countries that ad
opted antitrust laws before 1990).21 In Figure 6, the top panels graph the results
of the same cross-sectional regressions reported in Figure 5, and the bottom pan
els present binned scatterplots created when estimating regression specifications
from column 3 of Table 4 while pooling the data from 1990 to 2010.22
The results in Figure 6A suggest that there is still a positive relationship be
tween trade openness and antitrust policies between 1990 and 2010 when exclud
ing late adopters. Although the results reported in Figure 6A are not statistically
significant for this sample, the coefficients are positive, and the size of the esti
mates is similar to those from Figure 5 for the years before 1990—they are sim
ply less precisely estimated. As the binned scatterplot shows, the correlation is
positive overall for this sample. Figure 6B excludes countries that had established
antitrust agencies as of 1990. The results suggest that there is not a positive re
lationship between trade openness and antitrust stringency when excluding the
early adopters of antitrust law. Taken together, the results in Figure 6 suggest that
the positive correlation between trade openness and antitrust stringency does not
21
22

Both samples include countries that did not adopt antitrust laws before 2010.
Section OA4 of the Online Appendix recreates Tables 3 and 4 for early adopters and late adopters.
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disappear after 1990 because of changes in the relationship for jurisdictions with
established regimes (that is, early adopters); it disappears because there is not a
strong correlation between trade openness and antitrust stringency in jurisdic
tions that adopted their regimes during this period (that is, late adopters).
The next logical question is why late adopters of antitrust laws pass statutes
with levels of stringency that do not positively correlate with their exposure to
trade. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that established jurisdictions like
the EU and the United States began to urge developed and developing coun
tries alike to adopt antitrust laws (Fox 1997). The EU, for instance, systemati
cally requires countries to adopt antitrust laws as a condition of signing trade
agreements with the EU or joining the EU (Hoekman 2002). Countries thus may
have adopted antitrust laws after, or as a precondition to, signing a preferential
trade agreement (PTA) or joining a regional organization (RO) (Kronthaler and
Stephan 2007) and not for reasons that stem from their levels of trade openness.
We also collected data that can be used to preliminarily explore whether the
presence of antitrust requirements in PTAs and ROs can help to explain the
changing relationship between trade openness and antitrust stringency that be
gan in the 1990s. First, we built a new data set of antitrust provisions in PTAs us
ing the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig
2014).23 The DESTA team provided us with copies of the 596 PTAs for which they
obtained copies of the text. We developed a survey instrument to code the PTAs,
extending a sample of PTAs coded earlier (Bradford and Büthe 2015). We coded
whether the PTA contained an obligation for signatories to have or maintain
antitrust laws and identified 173 PTAs that contained such an antitrust require
ment. Figure 7 maps the countries that were signatories of a PTA that contained
an antitrust requirement by 2010. As Figure 7 shows, there was an explosion of
PTAs that required each party to adopt or maintain an antitrust law during the
1990s. In fact, of the 173 PTAs with such an antitrust requirement, 161 are from
1991 or later. Moreover, almost every country in the world has signed a PTA with
an antitrust requirement. Notably, although only 126 countries had an antitrust
law in place by 2010, 179 countries had signed a PTA that requires them to do
so.24
Second, we researched ROs that regulate antitrust policy in some way. The de
gree of integration facilitated by ROs varies, ranging from the creation of custom
unions that establish uniform external tariffs to the creation of common markets
that allow for the free flow of capital and labor (Ravenhill 2017). We identified
seven ROs that regulated members’ antitrust policies by 2010: the Andean Com
munity, the Caribbean Community, COMESA, the EEA, the EU, the Economic
Community of West African States, and the West African Economic and Mone
23
For more information about the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) data set, see DESTA,
Project Description (https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/project-description/). We thank the
DESTA team for sharing the texts of the preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
24
This discrepancy may be because the requirements of PTAs are not enforced or because some
PTAs have long implementation periods. However, we leave to future research the question of why
so many countries do not have antitrust laws despite having signed PTAs requiring them.
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Figure 7. Signatories to a preferential trading agreement that requires antitrust policies
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Figure 8. Membership in regional groups that require antitrust policies
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tary Union. Figure 8 maps the countries that are members of these ROs. In total,
80 countries are members of these organizations, 50 of which had domestic anti
trust laws in place by 2010. Of those countries, 20 had antitrust regulations prior
to 1990, but 30 adopted them between 1990 and 2010.
Table 5 reports the results of regressions testing whether PTAs and ROs may
explain the changing relationship between trade openness and antitrust strin
gency that began in the 1990s for late adopters. The table includes observations
for country-years between 1990 and 2010 for which the country has signed a
PTA with an antitrust requirement and observations for the same time period
for which the country is a member of one of the seven ROs.25 The results for both
samples suggest that there is no clear relationship between trade openness and
antitrust stringency for these countries. We caution, however, that these results
should not be interpreted causally, and further research is needed to understand
the role that PTAs and ROs have in the adoption of antitrust policies. In fact, al
though some prior research explores the antitrust provisions of PTAs and ROs
(Bradford and Büthe 2015; Sokol 2008), there is limited research exploring how
these provisions have translated into domestic policies (Hoeffken 2016). Our re
sults suggest that this may be an important avenue for inquiry.
7. Trade Openness and Antitrust Enforcement
The results in Section 6 suggest that the stringency of the antitrust laws that
many countries adopted after the 1990s do not positively correlate with their ex
posure to trade. Of course, statutes may not accurately capture the stringency of
countries’ antitrust regimes. Some countries with sparse antitrust laws may ag
gressively enforce them, while some countries with stringent laws may never pur
sue a single case. For this reason, although the results in Section 6 suggest that the
positive relationship between trade openness and antitrust laws disappears after
1990, it does not mean that there was not a positive relationship between trade
openness and antitrust enforcement.
We also built a data set on antitrust enforcement resources and activities that
allows us to answer this question.26 Because some countries with antitrust laws
have not established agencies to enforce those laws, we first identified jurisdic
tions with antitrust agencies. For the agencies we identified, we reviewed publicly
available information about their enforcement resources and activities from their
websites and annual reports, resources such as the Global Competition Review
and the online platform Getting the Deal Through, and research by organizations
like the OECD and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). To supplement the publicly available information, we produced
questionnaires individually tailored for each agency and contacted the agencies
directly to ask for missing information or clarification when publicly available in
25
Table 5 excludes countries that adopted antitrust laws prior to 1990—early adopters—because,
instead of being influenced by the antitrust requirements of PTAs and regional organizations, those
countries were likely pushing for their inclusion.
26
We fully explain the data collection process in Bradford et al. (2019).
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Table 5
Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements and Regional Organizations
Reduced Form
Preferential trade agreements:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Regional organizations:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Region dummies
Time trend

Two-Stage Least Squares

(1)

(2)

(3)

.167+
(.092)

−.043
(.068)

−.104
(.071)

.055
(.112)

−.064
(.116)

−.227*
(.094)

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

(4)

(5)

(6)

.380*
(.181)

−.112
(.193)

−.329
(.294)

.098
(.187)
No
No

−.137
(.269)
Yes
No

−.580+
(.348)
Yes
Yes

Note. Dependent variables are from the antitrust enforcement data set. Robust standard errors clus
tered by country are in parentheses. All regressions include controls for population and area. The
first-stage instrument is PTSH.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.

formation was conflicting. We typically contacted an agency following an intro
duction by a personal contact in the agency, local antitrust practitioners, interna
tional legal academia, or an organization such as UNCTAD or the International
Competition Network. In response to our inquiries, 103 agencies cooperated
with us. We were able to obtain some data from 112 agencies representing 100 ju
risdictions (our research suggests that 116 jurisdictions had an agency in 2010).27
From these data, we use four variables to measure antitrust resources and en
forcement: the variable Budget is the log of the amount of money allocated for
an antitrust-specific agency divided by the log of the country’s GDP,28 Staff Size
is the log of the number of employees who work at the antitrust agency,29 Inves
tigations is the log of the number of agency investigations into abuse of dom
inance and cartels per year, and Remedies is the log of the number of abuse of
dominance and cartel investigations that resulted in remedies.30 Figure 9 plots the
27
We tried to collect the same data from each jurisdiction, but not all agencies provided informa
tion about all variables or data for all relevant years. In addition, some agencies provided additional
or slightly different information than what we requested. Our data set thus does not have complete
coverage for all country-years for which we obtained data. Moreover, the data coverage is sparser
earlier in the 1990s than in the 2000s. For instance, we are missing budget data for 462 country-year
observations from 1990 to 1999 and for 334 observations from 2000 to 2010.
28
When collecting data on budgets, we asked the agencies vested with multiple responsibilities
(such as consumer protection and antitrust law) to report only the budget dedicated to antitrust
enforcement. We divide the natural log of the budget by the natural log of the country’s budget to
account for differences in market size.
29
As with budgets, when collecting data on staff numbers, we asked the agencies vested with mul
tiple responsibilities to report only the staff dedicated to antitrust enforcement.
30
We exclude merger data when calculating the number of investigations and remedies because
firms’ merger activity may be completely exogenous to the agency. However, the results are robust
to including merger data in these variables.

Figure 9. Antitrust enforcement resources and activities, 2010
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Table 6
Trade Openness and Antitrust Enforcement Resources and Activities
Reduced Form
Budget:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Staff Size:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Investigations:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Remedies:
PTSH
Trade Openness
Region dummies
Time trend
Country fixed effects

Two-Stage Least Squares

(1)

(2)

(3)

.379**
(.085)

.192*
(.084)

.208**
(.072)

1.240**
(.292)

.601*
(.281)

.757**
(.242)

.718**
(.180)

.372*
(.173)

.219
(.207)

.311**
(.114)

.096
(.108)

.211+
(.109)

No
No
No

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

(4)

(5)

(6)

1.065**
(.314)

.671*
(.329)

1.791
(1.145)

3.487** 2.089*
(1.002) (1.034)

6.484
(4.082)

2.020**
(.626)

1.300+
(.660)

1.892
(1.967)

.866**
(.331)
No
No
No

.331
(.363)
Yes
No
No

1.802
(1.254)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note. The dependent variables are from the antitrust enforcement data set. Robust standard errors
clustered by country are in parentheses. All regressions include controls for population and area. The
first-stage instrument is PTSH.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

values for these variables for each country as of 2010. Although there is variance
among variables, all four are positively correlated with countries’ CLI scores.31
Table 6 reports regressions using the four variables from 1990 to 2010 as the
dependent variable. The regressions largely recreate the specifications from
Tables 3 and 4, but given possible fluctuations in enforcement resources and ac
tivities from year to year, columns 3 and 6 include country fixed effects. All of the
coefficients for the trade measures are positive, and 17 of 24 of the relationships
are statistically significant at the .1 level or higher.32 The results are especially in
31
In 2010, the correlations with CLI for the variables are Budget = .47, Staff Size = .49, Investi
gations = .38, and Remedies = .35.
32
The fact that the results are not consistently statistically significant may be due to measurement
error as a result of missing values in the dependent variable. We exclude observations for which we
were unable to collect data for the dependent variable. However, the results are substantially the
same when we include those observations while coding their values as 0 and including a dummy
variable for observations for which the data are missing.
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Figure 10. Predicted trade and antitrust enforcement

teresting considering the results in Section 6 documenting that the positive rela
tionship between trade openness and the stringency of antitrust laws waned after
the 1990s. However, Table 6 suggests that enforcement resources and activities
remained positively correlated with exposure to trade during 1990–2010. For
those who believe that enforcement is a better measure of stringency than law on
the books, this may be the strongest evidence yet that increased trade openness
is associated with countries adopting and maintaining more stringent antitrust
regimes.
To further explore why we still find a positive correlation between trade open
ness and antitrust enforcement for 1990–2010, we recreate our regressions for
the two subsamples in Figure 6, that is, excluding late adopters and excluding
early adopters. Figure 10 presents binned scatterplots using the regression speci
fications from column 6 of Table 6 for these subsamples. The results in Figure 10
suggest that the correlations between predicted trade shares and the measures of
antitrust enforcement resources and activities are weakly positive. However, al
though the coefficients of interest are consistently positive when running the full
set of regression specifications from Table 6, they are not consistently statistically
significant. The results are inconclusive but are noticeably different from those in
Figure 6. Thus, taken together, the results in Section 6 suggest that late adopters
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may have adopted antitrust laws that did not correspond to their trade openness,
but the results in in this section suggest that countries with greater exposure to
trade may be more likely to dedicate resources and pursue cases to enforce those
laws.
8. Conclusion
We use new comparative antitrust data to test whether countries with greater
trade openness also have more stringent antitrust regimes. When instrumenting
for trade openness using predicted trade flows, we find a positive and statistically
significant relationship between trade openness and countries’ antitrust laws.
Our results are largely consistent when using alternative methods for measur
ing antitrust stringency and trade and when introducing additional data sets that
more comprehensively measure countries’ antitrust regimes.
We leave several important questions for future research. First, our results do
not settle the theoretical debate over whether countries that exhibit trade open
ness benefit from having more stringent antitrust regimes. High levels of trade
openness and strict antitrust regimes may complement each other and create
more competitive markets, but stringent antitrust regimes may be redundant
once a country is exposed to trade. Future research should test the effect of the re
lationship between trade openness and antitrust stringency on market outcomes.
Second, our results do not explore why countries with greater trade openness
are likely to have also adopted more stringent antitrust regimes. Countries may be
pursuing the strategies together to promote more competitive markets. However,
with increasing trade liberalization, domestic firms may urge the government to
employ antitrust policy in ways that allow them to obtain protection from for
eign rivals (Guzman 1998; Baumol and Ordover 1985). For instance, Dixit (1984)
notes that trade liberalization is commonly thought to invite domestic mergers
and limit foreign entry in an effort to help domestic industry withstand compe
tition. Similarly, Bond (2013) argues that large economies that can affect world
prices may use trade and antitrust policies strategically to manipulate the terms
of trade in their favor.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, there are a few empirical studies
that suggest that countries may use antitrust policies to protect domestic firms
from foreign competition. For instance, Shughart, Silverman, and Tollison (1995)
study US antitrust enforcement budgets prior to 1981 and find a positive correla
tion between the level of imports and antitrust enforcement budgets for the De
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which they interpret as
evidence of antitrust regulations being leveraged to counter foreign competition.
In addition, Özden (2005–6) examines 209 mergers in the EU from 1995 to 1999
involving at least one US firm and finds that more extensive review of a merger is
likely if the target is European or if all US firms in the industry have high market
share. This, Özden argues, signifies a political and economic tendency to protect
European firms. Finally, Cremieux and Snyder (2016) study cartel enforcement
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by the EU and the United States and find that the United States levies signifi
cantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms.
However, others question any systematic use of antitrust law for protection
ist purposes, noting that antitrust regulation is a blunt instrument to manipulate
trade flows (Bradford 2007). For instance, Bradford, Jackson, and Zytnick (2018),
a study on EU merger control in 1990–2014, contradicts the finding of Özden
(2005–6). Using data covering over 5,000 mergers, Bradford, Jackson, and Zyt
nick (2018) find no evidence that the European Commission intervenes more fre
quently or more extensively in mergers involving foreign acquirers. Thus, the de
bate over whether the surge in antitrust regimes in the presence of open trade is a
sign of countries’ steadfast commitment to market competition or, alternatively,
economic protectionism moving from traditional trade instruments to antitrust
instruments remains unresolved.
These results provide new evidence about the relationship between interna
tional trade and antitrust policy. Yet research on the relationship between trade
and antitrust law should not end here. We hope that our project will spark new
empirical investigations about whether protectionism can migrate from trade
policy to antitrust policy as a result of trade opening and about how these two pol
icy tools can best be used to promote competitive markets and economic growth.
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